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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
James Michael Beyer appeals from his judgment of conviction for attempted
strangulation.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Beyer with one count of felony attempted strangulation. (R., pp.
44-45.) At trial Beyer’s former girlfriend, Mandy McConnell, and her two children, M.M.
and A.O., testified that, in the course of an argument, Beyer grabbed McConnell by the
throat, threw her to the floor, pinned her there, and strangled her to near unconsciousness.
(Tr., p. 152, L. 4 – p. 158, L. 10; p. 187, L. 13 – p. 193, L. 2; p. 318, L. 21 – p. 329, L. 4.)
McConnell suffered marks and bruising on her neck, arm, and head. (Tr., p. 195, L. 7 – p.
199, L. 13; p. 329, L. 22 – p. 336, L. 25; State’s Exhibits 8-20, 24-25.)
At the conclusion of trial the jury returned a guilty verdict. (R., p. 138.) Beyer
timey appealed from the entry of judgment. (R., pp. 144-51.)
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ISSUES
Beyer states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Considering that Mr. Beyer gave only a conflicting account of his
altercation of [sic] Ms. McConnell, and did not imply that the kids
had recently fabricated their account of the physical altercation, did
the district court abuse its discretion by allowing Officer Cooper to
testify about what the kids told him on the day of the incident?

II.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct amounting to fundamental
error by telling the jury that Mr. Beyer had lied to them and by
misstating Mr. Beyer’s testimony?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Beyer failed to show the district court abused its discretion by allowing the
admission of evidence of a prior consistent statement?
2.

Has Beyer failed to show fundamental error in the prosecutor’s closing argument?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Beyer Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The
Admission Of Evidence Of A Prior Consistent Statement
A.

Introduction
In rebuttal, the prosecution asked the responding officer about what witness M.M.

had told him when he responded to the call about the crime. (Tr., p. 445, Ls. 6-7.) The
defense asserted a hearsay objection. (Tr., p. 445, Ls. 8, 23-25.) The prosecution asserted
the evidence was not hearsay because it was offered to rebut an express or implied claim
of recent fabrication. (Tr., p. 445, Ls. 10-21.) The district court overruled the objection.
(Tr., p. 446, Ls. 1-12.)
Beyer claims there was no express or implied claim of recent fabrication, and
therefore this ruling was error. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.) Beyer’s claim does not
withstand scrutiny. The record shows he did present testimony at trial raising an implied
inference of recent fabrication or improper influence.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence.

State v. Harris, 141 Idaho 721, 724, 117 P.3d 135, 138 (Ct. App. 2005). Review of a trial
court’s hearsay rulings “is limited to determining whether” the district court’s decision was
“within the outer boundaries of its discretion,” “consistent with” applicable legal standards,
and “reached through an exercise of reason.” In re Estate of Conway, 152 Idaho 933, 941,
277 P.3d 380, 388 (2012).
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C.

Beyer Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter

asserted.” I.R.E. 801(c). Hearsay is generally not admissible. I.R.E. 802. A prior
statement by a witness is not hearsay if “consistent with declarant’s testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against declarant of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive; or, to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness
when attacked on another ground.” I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).
Where admission of evidence under this rule is premised upon evidence the witness
had a motive to lie, this exception to what is hearsay “only permits introduction of out-ofcourt statements that were made prior to the time when the declarant would have a motive
to lie.” State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 14, 304 P.3d 276, 289 (2013). Where admission of the
evidence is premised upon a claim that testimony was different than prior statements by
the witness, the evidence is properly “offered to rebut an express charge of recent
fabrication.” State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 732, 24 P.3d 44, 49 (2001). Admission of
a child’s prior statement may be proper to rebut a claim of improper influence by a parent.
See State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54, 58–59, 896 P.2d 962, 966–67 (1995).
Application of these standards to the record shows M.M.’s statement to the officer
near the time of the crime was properly admitted.
Witness M.M. testified that she was in the upstairs master bedroom during part of
the argument. (Tr., p. 145, L. 8 – p. 152, L. 2; State’s Exhibits 2-7.) She left the room to
get her brother’s phone, and thereafter sat on the stairs for a while. (Tr., p. 154, L. 24 – p.
156, L. 8.) She then returned upstairs and saw Beyer throw her mother, McConnell, to the
ground in the hallway and start to strangle her. (Tr., p. 156, L. 9 – p. 158, L. 19.) In cross-
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examination M.M. testified that she was not in the bedroom when the attack occurred, but
was in the hallway above the stairs peeking around the corner. (Tr., p. 172, L. 15 – p. 174,
L. 12.)
Beyer testified that M.M. was not in the room, but later came into the room when
McConnell called her into the room to vindicate her in the argument. (Tr., p. 399, L. 8 –
p. 404, L. 22.) McConnell then told her son to call the police, before there had been any
violence. (Tr., p. 404, L. 2 – p. 409, L. 25.) Beyer testified that M.M. left the room later,
but not to get a phone, and was out of “eye shot” and not in the hall. (Tr., p. 406, L. 11 –
p. 407, L. 15.) Beyer testified that McConnell “body check[ed]” him, and to protect himself
and his clothing he put his hands on her shoulder and collarbone, pushed her out of the
room, and fell with her to the floor accidentally. (Tr., p. 407, L. 17 – p. 414, L. 3.) He
testified he did not see M.M. in the hallway until after he had gotten up off McConnell.
(Tr., p. 414, Ls. 4-6; p. 416, L. 15 – p. 417, L. 7.)
M.M. and McConnell testified consistently about the physical confrontation and
crime. (Compare Tr., p. 152, L. 4 – p. 158, L. 10 with Tr., p. 318, L. 21 – p. 329, L. 4.)
This testimony varied greatly with the version of events provided by Beyer. (Tr., p. 399,
L. 8 – p. 417, L. 7.) Part of the defense cross-examination of M.M. inquired about with
whom she had discussed the facts of the case, specifically with the officer and with the
prosecutor. (Tr., p. 178, L. 25 – p. 180, L. 13.) Moreover, the evidence established that
M.M. was 12 years old, McConnell was her mother, and she was not related to Beyer. (Tr.,
p. 140, L. 23 – p. 141, L. 21.)
The record shows an implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive. On this record, including Beyer’s testimony that M.M. was not in the hall to see
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what she testified to seeing, defense counsel certainly could have argued that in the months
between the event and the trial McConnell had exerted improper influence on her
adolescent daughter such that the consistency of their testimony was not the product of
truth but the product of preparation. Narrowing the window of possible coordination of
stories, either deliberate or inadvertent, to the less than half-an-hour between the event and
the arrival of police certainly rebuts that implication of fabrication or improper influence.
Beyer argues he “did not impliedly or expressly claim during his testimony that the
kids had recently fabricated their testimony or acted under improper influence or motive.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) The record, however, shows that (1) Beyer directly claimed that
McConnell used her children at the time to support her in the argument and to call the
police prior to any crime taking place (Tr., p. 400, L. 6 – p. 409, L. 25); (2) Beyer testified
to a version of events significantly different from the version told by McConnell and her
two children (compare Tr., p. 399, L. 8 – p. 417, L. 7 with Tr., p. 152, L. 4 – p. 158, L. 10;
p. 186, L. 18 – p. 194, L. 21; p. 318, L. 21 – p. 329, L. 4); (3) Beyer testified that M.M. did
not enter the hall until after he had pushed McConnell to the floor and gotten up off her
(Tr., p. 406, L. 11 – p. 407, L. 15; p. 414, Ls. 4-6; p. 416, L. 15 – p. 417, L. 7); (4) the
children had a maternal relationship with McConnell, and no significant relationship with
Beyer (Tr., p. 140, L. 23 – p. 142, L. 16; p. 183, L. 12 – p. 184, L. 7); and (5) the trial
occurred several months after the event in question (e.g., Tr., p. 116, Ls. 14-23). The prior
consistent statements by McConnell’s children rebutted the inference that McConnell had
improperly influenced her children’s testimony over the months leading to the trial to
conform to her version of events. The record rebuts Beyer’s claim there was no implied
claim of fabrication or influence.
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Beyer also argues that the children’s motive to lie pre-dates the statements to
Officer Cooper. (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) This argument assumes that the motive is the
children’s relationship with their mother, which certainly pre-dates the interview. As
established above, however, the inference is whether there was fabrication of testimony at
the instigation of McConnell or other improper influence. (See also Tr., p. 445, Ls. 10-12;
p. 446, Ls. 2-10.) Although there was a short window of opportunity (measured in minutes)
between the event and the arrival of the police, there was a much longer one (measured in
months) between the interview and the trial.

The evidence of the prior consistent

statements rebuts the implied charge of improper influence during those months.
Beyer’s unsupported claims that there was no implied charge of improper influence
or recent fabrication does not withstand analysis. Such a charge is implied in the evidence
and circumstances of this case. The district court was within its discretion when it
concluded Beyer’s testimony “could be construed as an attempt to raise a claim of recent
fabrication.” (Tr., p. 446, Ls. 2-10.) Beyer has therefore failed to show error.

D.

The Alleged Error Is Harmless
Even if the evidence of M.M.’s prior statement was hearsay, its admission was

harmless. “Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected ….” I.R.E. 103(a). “Any error, defect,
irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”
I.C.R. 52. “An error is harmless if a reviewing court can find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury would have reached the same result without the admission of the challenged
evidence.” State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 887, 119 P.3d 653, 662 (Ct. App. 2005).
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The evidence in question was that M.M. told the responding officer that she had
seen Beyer grab her mother and push her to the floor with “one hand on her neck and then
the other hand on her shoulder.” (Tr., p. 446, Ls. 13-24.) This evidence did not add
substantively to the evidence already presented. (Tr., p. 156, L. 15 – p. 158, L. 10.) That
M.M. told the same version both to the police and at trial might have bolstered her
credibility but, if Beyer is correct and he never challenged her credibility, then it added
nothing to the trial. Admission of evidence that M.M.’s statement to the police was
consistent with her trial testimony was harmless even if it was hearsay.

II.
Beyer Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s Closing Argument
A.

Introduction
In rebuttal closing, the prosecutor argued that most witnesses “can’t conform their

testimony to what others have said” in court, but Beyer was not only in a position to do so,
“he tried to do it with you.” (Tr., p. 521, L. 25 – p. 522, L. 7.) As evidence that Beyer had
conformed his testimony to better match the other testimony at trial, the prosecutor pointed
to discrepancies and inconsistencies in Beyer’s statement to police and his trial testimony,
specifically that he told police that McConnell had “jumped on his back” but he testified
at trial that she had “body-checked” him. (Tr., p. 522, L. 8 – p. 524, L. 15.) The prosecutor
concluded that the “new story makes it easier” to believe the children were mistaken rather
than lying about seeing him strangle their mother. (Tr., p. 524, Ls. 16-21.) The prosecutor
concluded this part of the argument by stating that Beyer’s “new story” makes it “easier to
rationalize” the children’s testimony as a “misunderstanding” and that was why it was
“important” for the jury to “understand and see the difference between what he said then
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and now” was not merely a change in words, but a change in story that showed he was
“lying, first to the officers and then two days ago to you.” (Tr., p. 529, Ls. 3-22.) The
prosecutor then went on to discuss which testimony fit the circumstantial evidence. (Tr.,
p. 529, L. 23 – p. 532, L. 3.)
For the first time on appeal Beyer contends these arguments were an improper
appeal to emotion and a misstatement of the evidence. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-14.)
Review of Beyer’s claim, however, shows neither improper argument nor, more
importantly, fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
“[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct depends

on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho
694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). Where, as here, a defendant fails to timely object at
trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set
aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the alleged
misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245
P.3d 961, 980 (2010).

C.

Beyer Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it “constitutes

fundamental error.” State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App.
2010). In the absence of an objection “the appellate court’s authority to remedy that error
is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being deprived of
his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal.” State
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v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). Review without objection will
not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that “one or more of the defendant’s unwaived
constitutional rights were violated”; (2) the constitutional error is “clear or obvious” on the
record, “without the need for any additional information” including information “as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision”; and (3) the “defendant must
demonstrate that the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights,” generally by
showing a reasonable probability that the error “affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.” Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
Beyer first argues the prosecutor committed misconduct when she argued Beyer
“tried to” conform his testimony to better respond to the children’s testimony “with you”
and that he lied “to you.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12 (citing Tr., p. 522, Ls. 6-7; p. 529, Ls.
21-22).) This argument finds no support in the law.
It is proper to explain how the evidence adduced at trial affects the credibility of
various witnesses, including the defendant. State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 928, 354 P.3d
462, 490 (2015) (not misconduct to “comment” on defendant’s credibility and “explain”
how evidence showed he was “dishonest”); State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871–72, 332
P.3d 767, 783–84 (2014) (argument that jury could put transcript of defense witness
testimony “in the trash” was proper); State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 188, 254 P.3d 77, 89
(Ct. App. 2011) (prosecutor’s arguments that the defendant had lied did “not constitute
misconduct” where supported by evidence).

“[P]rosecutors may argue reasonable

inferences based on the evidence, including that one of the two sides is lying.” State v.
Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, ___, 399 P.3d 804, 824 (2017) (internal quotations omitted). The
prosecutor’s argument that Beyer had lied in his testimony, based on the evidence adduced
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at trial, was proper. Beyer has failed to show constitutional error, that the error was clear
on the record (including that lack of objection was because trial counsel did not see any
point or advantage in objecting and therefore risking emphasizing the argument to the jury)
or that he was prejudiced.
Beyer next argues the prosecutor misstated his testimony regarding his statement
to the police. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13.) The passage cited by Beyer is:
But [Beyer] forgot which lie he told Officer Cooper. And he told you that.
He hadn’t reviewed the audio. He didn’t remember saying that she had
jumped on his back. He was sure that he had said that she had body-checked
him. He was sure that he had said she knocked him off balance and that he
had escorted her out.
(Tr., p. 523, Ls. 7-12 (cited Appellant’s brief, p. 13).) This argument, in context, was
proper.
Beyer testified that he was getting his clothes out of the closet when McConnell
said “‘let me help you do this faster,’” “body-checked” him out of the way causing him to
almost lose his balance, and started ripping his clothes off the hanger; so he turned and
pushed her toward the hallway when they accidentally tripped and he fell on top of her.
(Tr., p. 406, L. 6 – p. 412, L. 19.) He also testified he told Officer Cooper “what had
happened.” (Tr., p. 419, Ls. 4-9.) Officer Cooper, however, testified that Beyer had given
him a very different version of events; specifically, that Beyer stated at least three times
that McConnell “jumped on his back” and had not stated that she had “body-checked him,”
among other inconsistencies. (Tr., p. 448, L. 21 – p. 451, L. 8.) The prosecutor’s argument
that Beyer, in conforming his testimony to the testimony presented at trial (Tr., p. 521, L.
25 – p. 529, L. 22), forgot that he had presented a very different version of events to the
police was proper and based on the evidence.
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Beyer contends that the prosecutor’s argument was improper because he
acknowledged some of the discrepancies between his trial testimony and his statement
when confronted with them in cross-examination.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)

This

argument depends on the prosecutor’s argument being about what Beyer admitted in crossexamination. In context, however, it is clear that the prosecutor was not arguing what he
admitted in cross-examination but was arguing about his direct testimony; specifically what
Beyer either forgot or thought he remembered about his statement when he crafted the
version he presented as his defense. (Tr., p. 521, L. 25 – p. 529, L. 22.) The prosecutor
properly argued that Beyer had failed to account for his prior statement when he crafted
his direct testimony to give him the best chance of acquittal in light of the state’s evidence,
and discrepancies between his statement and his testimony showed he was lying in both.
Even if Beyer could show that the argument was objectionable, he failed to show
that it was fundamental error. First, Beyer has failed to show that allegedly misrepresenting
evidence regarding impeachment (as opposed to evidence of guilt) rises to the level of a
constitutional violation under any circumstances, much less the facts of this case. Second,
as pointed out above, the proper interpretation of the prosecutor’s argument is that it was a
proper assertion that Beyer’s testimony was based on an inadequate memory of what he
had claimed in his statement, so the claimed error is not clear. Moreover, Beyer has failed
to show that counsel did not tactically elect not to object because an objection would merely
call additional attention to the fact that in cross-examination Beyer admitted glaring
inconsistencies between his statement and his testimony. Finally, there is no prejudice
because Beyer clearly gave conflicting versions of events and there is no basis for believing
that the jury ignored its oath and decided this case on a basis other than the evidence.

12

Beyer has cited no law showing that an argument, based on the evidence, that the
defendant lied when testifying or when providing a statement to police is improper. To the
contrary, such an argument is proper. Lankford, 162 Idaho at ___, 399 P.3d at 824
(“prosecutors may argue reasonable inferences based on the evidence, including that one
of the two sides is lying” (internal quotations omitted)). His argument therefore fails on
all three prongs of the fundamental error test. Beyer’s argument that the prosecutor
misrepresented the evidence also fails on all three prongs because it was proper to argue
that, in conforming his testimony to the testimony presented at trial, Beyer failed to account
for his earlier, contrary statement. Even if the argument could have been interpreted as an
argument that Beyer had denied making certain factual assertions in his statement to police,
Beyer has failed to show constitutional error, failed to show clear error, and failed to show
prejudice.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction.
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2018.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen______________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of February, 2018, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic
copy to:
MAYA P. WALDRON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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